All the leading members of Haiti's ruling military junta have gone quietly into comfortable exile, deposed President Jean-Bertrand Aristide has returned to office and U.S. soldiers are patrolling Haiti streets as peacekeepers and are hailed as heroes by the populace.
This may seem like justification for President Clinton's decision to send troops to Haiti, but the departure of the junta and the return of Aristide are only the first chapters in a book that may yet have an unhappy ending.On his triumphant return, Aristide said all the right things, calling for reconciliation and renouncing vengeance. That may be easier in theory than practice. Their leaders are gone, but the country still has disgruntled militia, a disorganized army and resentful police - all foes of Aristide. Random acts of violence and intimidation still occur.
American and U.N. agencies are trying to rebuild the police and army, seeking to sort out human rights criminals from their ranks while recruiting Haitians to be trained as new soldiers and police. But the former rank and file, many of them tainted, will necessarily make up a large part of the new regime's forces.
Two-thirds of the populace that enthusiastically support Aristide are the poorest of Haiti's people. The other third, which helped the army overthrow Aristide's government, is keeping a low profile for the present but holds the reins of economic power.
The challenge facing Aristide was summed up on his return when he said his first hope is to move his country from abject misery to mere poverty - a telling comment on where things are at the moment.
Here are just a few of the challenges facing Aristide:
- Infrastructure: Only a fourth of Haiti's roads are paved, and nearly all are in poor condition. A recent survey showed 96 percent of all roads in need of repairs. Ports and railroads are dilapidated. Most Haitians have no access to running water; garbage col-lec-tion has been largely absent for three years; open sewers contribute to disease. Phone service is minimal at best and mostly unavailable.
- Agriculture: Two-thirds of all Haitians are farmers, but agriculture is in ruins. Fertilizers and seed are scarce. Many farmers had to sell livestock and equipment to buy food. Only 20 percent of Haiti's land is arable, and erosion is destroying thousands of acres of cropland a year.
- Private enterprise: The embargo forced closure of dozens of factories. Unemployment is about 50 percent. Tourism, once a major source of foreign exchange, is nonexistent.
- Education. More than half the population is illiterate. The public school system has collapsed, and few Haitians can afford the private schools that provide most of the teaching.
- Public finances: After seizing power in 1991, the military junta stopped collecting taxes from businesses and the wealthy, the main groups supporting the ouster of Aristide. But government employment soared, and a bloated bureaucracy takes 75 percent of all government spending.
In the midst of this chaos, American soliders are trying to keep peace without becoming too involved. The longer the occupation lasts, more questions are going to be asked about why U.S. forces are there in the first place.
Secretary of State Warren Christopher admitted to reporters this past week that Haiti was not a "vital" U.S. interest but said it was "important." That may not be a good enough explanation as Haiti becomes more troubled in the coming months.
The best move is for U.S. forces to be withdrawn as quickly as possible and replaced by U.N. peacekeepers. The U.N. presence won't make Haiti more livable, but it would remove American troops from a situation that clearly is going to produce more future problems than answers.