GLOBAL VIEWPOINT: Mr. Chairman, you are going to visit Germany next week to discuss, among other things, the future NATO mem-bership of the Visegrad countries - Hungary, Poland and the Czech and Slovak Republic. The Germans want membership for these countries as soon as possible, whereas the United States seems to prefer to wait and see. Why shouldn't these countries be granted membership as fast as possible?
JOHN SHALIKASHVILI: I don't think there is any significant difference between the German view and the American view. We both have concluded that the issue now is no longer whether, but when and how, the alliance is going to extend to the East. The immediate issue is to work as vigorously as possible at the Partnership for Peace because it will speed up the process by more quickly bringing closer together the militaries of the countries in the East with the militaries of the Alliance.If we make sure that the 1,200 standard NATO procedures we use are passed on to the armed forces in Poland and the Czech Republic and Romania and other places so they can begin to teach them in their (military) schools, then we have begun to create enduring relationships. Then it will be very normal for us to continually meet and exchange ideas and once in a while even participate in joint exercises where we test whether we haven't gotten closer together.
When the time comes to politically make the decision to extend an invitation, they will be able to be absorbed within the alliance much quicker than if we were not to do the Partnership for Peace. So I see that Partnership for Peace speeding up the process, not slowing it down.
The next thing we need to do is discuss the procedures for extending membership - and I think we should start that right now, and hopefully the two NATO summits this December will focus on it. Once we have the Partnership for Peace working and have these discussions and agreement on procedures for membership, that can be followed by discussions on who can become a member and when. We need to take it in these particular sequences.
GV: But isn't there a difference between the Partnership for Peace and NATO membership, because the Partnership for Peace could include a broader range of states than NATO? Russia, specifically, may be hard to imagine as a NATO member.
SHALIKASHVILI: Again, Partnership for Peace is not NATO membership. But vigorous participation in the Partnership for Peace is the best way to prepare yourself for eventual NATO membership.
I think the participation of the Russians in the Partnership for Peace increases transparency between what Russia is doing and what NATO nations are doing, and I think that transparency adds to security and stability. Certainly, the Partnership for Peace neither excludes nor includes anyone. It is not a prerequisite for membership, nor is participation an assurance of membership. But I think we would be doing a great disservice to nations that wish to become members if we did not encourage them to be as active as they possibly can be in a Partnership for Peace.
I cannot stress strongly enough how important this issue of having militaries that are already becoming close in their working relationship - in their daily habits of cooperation with NATO militaries - is before you can become a member of the alliance. So I am sometimes concerned that the discussion about membership discourages people to be active members in the Partnership for Peace.
On the one hand, people who are in the Partnership for Peace sometimes get the idea that maybe this is somehow a detour. It is not. It is the most direct road to membership.
GV: But not for all of them.
SHALIKASHVILI: We have purposely, at this time, not addressed the issue of who eventually will, who eventually might wish to become a member and whom the alliance might wish to become a member. But what we have said is that, at this point, we don't exclude anybody. We have remained silent on the issue of membership because first we need to get the Partnership for Peace working.
GV: Isn't it disappointing to see how NATO has been doing with regard to the conflict in Bosnia?
SHALIKASHVILI: I am very disappointed by what is happening in Bosnia. I am not sure if I would ascribe fault to anyone except those who are doing the fighting. I think the story of Bosnia is one that ought to sadden all of us. What we all need to concentrate on is finding the best and quickest way to bring the fighting to an end and keep this conflict from spreading. Those ought to be our two objectives.
This contact group (of the parties at conflict in Bosnia) has put a peace proposal on the table that has been accepted by one side, but not by the other. I think we should do everything possible to convince the Bosnian Serbs that it is to their advantage to accept that proposal and to bring this fighting to an end.
The winter is coming, with all its difficulties, and one more winter of fighting is going to bring just more death, more misery and more suffering to people who have suffered already too much. And there is no alternative out there to this peace plan that is on the table.
I think it is terribly important that the Bosnian Serbs recognize that they ought to sign up to that proposal and bring this fighting to an end. The Bosnian Serbs need to be convinced that the community of nations is serious about bringing this fighting to an end. We would be more efficient and our position would be much more credible if we did so.
I understand all of the problems that this presents for UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Forces), and I am not callous to UNPROFOR soldiers who are on the ground. But the lesson so far had been that, when NATO uses it airpower, the results were positive. And when it did not use its airpower, the results were not always positive. So I think a proper application of airpower would certainly benefit the overall effort.
I am also very satisfied that very recently there has been an agreement that has been fashioned between NATO and the U.N. that will make that application of airpower more efficient and effective when air strikes are called for. I hope that the military leaders of UNPROFOR will use those new procedures.
GV: Should Germany act as a normal NATO member regarding our area peacekeeping operations?
SHALIKASHVILI: I am of the view that Germany performed a very important service when it went to Somalia. I also think its participation with our AWACS forces over Bosnia has been extraordinary helpful. I look forward to Germany's participation in such international operations in the future.
Having worked with my German colleagues for the last 35 years, I look forward to working with them in the alliance and in peacekeeping operations. I think they have made a tremendous contribution to the Alliance, and Germany will make a great contribution to peacekeeping operations.
GV: What about peacemaking operations?
SHALIKASHVILI: I think that, these days, the lines are very blurred. I think you must judge each operation on its merits. But I, as an American, do not exclude German participation in peace enforcement operations any more than I would exclude any other nation.
GV: What is the projected time frame on ending the occupation in Haiti? When will the U.S. pull out?
SHALIKASHVILI: First of all, I have to tell you that the Haiti operation so far is going much better than we thought. I am very gratified by what our soldiers and civilians over there are doing, and how well they are doing it, and by the security climate there.
Nevertheless, we feel it is right that this multinational force that is there now remain there until after the parliamentary elections. The parliamentary elections will probably be in December of this year or January of next year, and then that force probably ought to leave, maybe in February, and be replaced by a United Nations blue-helmet operation. And to that force, the Americans will probably contribute approximately one-half. The United Nations force will consist of approximately 6,000 troops, so that is about 3,000 Americans.
The United Nations mission in Haiti will remain until after the presidential elections, which will be held in December of 1995, and the inauguration of the new president, which will occur in February of 1996. And then right after that, the mandate of the force will terminate and the force will disband and go home.
So, Americans as part of that multinational force and then as part of the United Nations force will stay until February of 1996. We will be rotating units out of there and also the multinational and the U.N. forces will be rotating so that no one stays a full year.