WASHINGTON — It seems to have taken the possibility of more American deaths keeping the peace in Iraq than winning the war to convince Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his chief deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, that they have been woefully incorrect and possibly negligent in their estimates of what it will take to bring some order out of the chaos there.
Pentagon recognition that Gen. Eric Shinseki, the Army chief of staff, was correct in his assessment of the size of the force necessary for pacification has come far too slowly. Shinseki, who is stepping down soon, partially because of this dispute, told Congress early on that it would require as many as several hundred thousand troops to win the peace — much to the unhappiness of Rumsfeld, who publicly disputed his general, telling reporters that it was "not logical" that it would require as many forces in the aftermath of war as to win it in the first place.
While there is still no total concession to an obvious miscalculation of troop needs, allied commanders have announced they will now keep a larger force on hand than originally thought. That seems reasonable, considering that American soldiers are still getting killed there as the lawlessness continues. There are an estimated 160,000 U.S. troops and British troops there now. Wolfowitz told Congress that this should be enough. Plans to send some home early have been abandoned, apparently.
Perhaps the Pentagon's civilian brass should have paid more attention to the generals, most of whom agreed with Shinseki. Wolfowitz's appearances before Congress of late have reminded old-timers of those of Defense Secretary Robert McNamara during the Vietnam War. McNamara had a habit of seeing the light at the end of the tunnel one day in appearances before Congress only to return the next with bad news and deny he had made the earlier prediction.
Wolfowitz told senators recently that it was the media's misreporting that made things in Iraq seem worse than they were. He blamed the media for overlooking the strides being made in rebuilding Iraq to report violence, looting and other lawlessness. Why should anyone be surprised at that? It is the nature of the bureaucratic beast, one must conclude, never to take responsibilities for mistakes, particularly as an election year approaches. This is a harsh assessment, but what other conclusion can be drawn from the failure to recognize from the start the postwar difficulties?
No one can deny that Rumsfeld and his advisers were correct in the high-tech, minimalist war plan they prepared. They won out over the conventional wisdom about the number of troops it would take, surprising even themselves and their critics with the swift victory. Iraq's social fabric, however, was left in tatters. Somehow, calculations of forces needed and the length of time pacification would require failed to take into account the various religious, economic and political differences in Iraq. For a great many years, the Iraqi people were governed by the Baath Party at the point of a gun. But party functionaries and enforcers are out of business and the results have been predictable. Anarchy has filled the void and American forces have not been able to stop it, particularly in Baghdad.
History is replete with examples of what happens in the aftermath of war. Insufficient military presence and permissiveness are disastrous for both those assigned to peacekeeping duty and the law-abiding citizens who want only to get back to some normality. There should not have been this miscalculation regarding Iraq. It isn't, as they say, rocket science.
Interestingly, it's not only Democrats on Capitol Hill who are upset. Republicans like the highly regarded Sen. Richard Lugar, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, have made it clear to the Pentagon that they are concerned about "inadequate" stabilization and reconstruction efforts in the initial plan.
Is it terribly naive to ask why we have decided that keeping the peace and rebuilding Iraq is our burden alone? Isn't it possible to bring the United Nations more actively into the process, or are we that unforgiving about the opposition to the war of France, Germany and Russia? In the future, it is a safe bet that some sort of broad U.N. involvement will be inevitable.
After winning a war quickly with an at times brilliant and innovative strategy that defied conventional wisdom, it would be a sorry thing to see it dramatically tarnished by stubborn refusal to realize what is necessary to win the peace. That always has been the real challenge of Iraq.
Dan K. Thomasson is former editor of the Scripps Howard News Service.