Some want to separate public “ethics” from private “morality.” It’s been tried. It doesn’t work — if our morality doesn’t control our ethics, our ethics become our morality.

Have you noticed how often we use the practically equivalent words “morality” and “ethics” to reinforce each other, doubling the terms to convince ourselves that we’re talking about something quite sophisticated and academic, and not merely appealing to some plain teaching about right and wrong learned from our mother or from the Bible? For example, we might hear: “Climate change raises questions not only of politics and economics, but of great significance from the standpoint of morality and ethics.”

The formula is a little puzzling as well as amusing, since it’s far from clear what one term adds to the other. “And ethics” seems to suggest that I’m not just talking about my own moral feelings, but about some rational ethical principles approved by ethical experts. It’s true that a university philosophy course on morality is likely to be entitled “Ethics 201,” a lingering tribute to Aristotle’s great treatise "The Nicomachean Ethics." But it might also appear in the catalog as “Moral Philosophy 201.”

There seems to be a faint and unstable distinction in our usage: “Morality” is more private and more a matter of rules or commandments honored by an individual, and “ethics” is more a question of a public ethos or body of shared customs and practices. We also use “ethics” to apply to the more or less established code of a profession or other distinct body, as in “medical ethics.” But even this public/private distinction is a matter of inconsistent usage: A quick Google search produced an article that confirmed my hunch (morals, private; ethics, public) — but then the very next article reversed the polarity, confidently explaining that “ethics” has to do with the individual’s “subjective understanding of right and wrong,” whereas “morals” concerns “societal norms.” So go figure. It’s all “ethics and morals” in any case — or, if the air of expertise or sophistication has worn off that phrase, then I suppose “morals and ethics.”

View Comments

In light of this fuzziness in our usage, I was interested to learn (from an excellent website: squaretwo.org) that a certain organization of religious women for the pursuit of “ethical government” had insisted quite pointedly on the distinction between “ethics” and “morals.” This group declares itself to be all about “ethics” (public, rational), but, when asked, made it clear that it wanted nothing to do with “morals” (private, religious, subjective). Most strikingly, the group dismissed “questions of right and wrong” in favor of “what is just and unjust.”

Now, the usage may seem idiosyncratic, but it reflects an argument that runs deep in modern liberalism: Since it’s hard to agree on what God or nature teach about morality, let us just set all those difficult philosophical and theological questions aside and define justice as purely secular — a simple human construction for human convenience, a set of rules that will allow us to get along without having to agree on any common moral purpose. What a relief to be rid of ancient struggles over the meaning of justice and the common good! We can forget about any transcendent moral vision and invent, as we say today, “social justice” — justice as a convenient construction of society for society.

We ought to find it a little disconcerting that this distinction between old-fashioned morality, keyed to a higher purpose, and social justice as a secular convention was invented by the great English theorist of absolute government, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). There is, Hobbes taught, no right by nature or by God, no morality or law in the state of nature, so human beings must invent justice from nothing and invent a sovereign to guarantee it. We like to think that we, in our exaltation of boundless individual freedom (in certain areas) are very far from Hobbes’ idea of absolute sovereignty, but his logic still holds sway: If justice knows no higher law, then the only bond of society is that all-too-human power we call the secular state. And, as Hobbes understood very well, when justice is “social,” religious freedom is very … optional.

“Ethics” and “morality” — it is tempting to try to sort them out. But in the end, they can’t be separated. Social justice does not solve the problem of religious morality. It becomes its own state religion.

Looking for comments?
Find comments in their new home! Click the buttons at the top or within the article to view them — or use the button below for quick access.