With a single dissent in both cases, the Utah Supreme Court on Friday upheld the convictions in two high-profile murder cases.
In one ruling, the justices rejected death-row inmate Von Lester Taylor's assertion that his lawyer was ineffective. In another, they said Debra Brown got a fair trial.Taylor, 32, received two death sentences in 1991 for killing two women at a mountain cabin in the Beaver Springs subdivision near Oakley, Summit County.
Brown, 39, was sentenced to life in prison in 1995 for shooting her former employer in the head while he was asleep.
Taylor and Edward Steven Deli, 28, both escapees from a prison halfway house, broke into the Tiede family cabin on Dec. 22, 1990. When family members arrived, Taylor shot and killed Kaye Tiede, 49, and her mother, Beth Potts, 76.
Later, he also shot Rolf Tiede, 51, who survived. He and Deli then tried to set fire to the cabin and fled with the Tiedes' two daughters as hostages. They were captured a short time later in the nearby town of Francis.
Taylor pleaded guilty to two counts of capital murder, and Deli was convicted on lesser charges.
Taylor appealed his conviction on grounds attorney Elliot Levine misinformed him about the potential effect of the guilty plea. Taylor also complained that Levine's philosophy about the role of the defense attorney conflicted with his duty to represent him and that Levine's low pay deprived him of effective counsel.
Writing for the majority, Justice Christine Durham said, "The chances that Taylor would have fared any better had the best criminal defense attorney in the country made the perfect argument are slim."
Prosecutors presented "overwhelming evidence" of Taylor's guilt, including eyewitness accounts, and Taylor voluntarily pleaded guilty despite his lawyer's advice that they take the case to trial, she said.
Taylor's objection to Levine's philosophy stemmed from statements the attorney made in closing arguments, where he said his role included helping defendants admit their guilt and take the appropriate punishment.
The Supreme Court agreed with the lower court's finding that the comments fell "within the broad range of reasonable professional judgment about jury strategy."
Citing the lawyer's occasional failure to connect stories and comments to the issue at hand during his closing argument, Durham said, "Overall, Levine did not give a virtuoso performance. "
However, she added, "We are not in a position to review every closing statement in a capital case to determine whether it was persuasive enough."
Taylor had also argued that Levine should have conducted a more thorough investigation of his psychological history in search of mitigating evidence that might have spared Taylor from the death sentence.
According to the lower court, Levine opted not to introduce mental-health information because it would have hurt rather than helped Taylor. The psychological reports contained information about Taylor's prior drug use and involvement with Satanism and witchcraft, including the drinking of animal blood.
"Levine quite plausibly decided that Satanic worship and blood drinking did not comport to the `boy next door' image he hoped to portray," Durham wrote.
However, she said the court was troubled by the state's suggestion that an extensive mitigation investigation may not always be necessary.
"We emphasize that the failure to perform an adequate mitigation workup represents ineffective assistance of counsel," Durham wrote. Levine's investigation, though "limited," was adequate, she said.
The justices also acknowledged that the low pay offered attorneys in capital homicide cases "creates a significant potential for harm," but said there was no evidence it affected Taylor's case. As a legal defender under contract with Summit County, Levine received $24,000 for his services.
In his dissent, Associate Chief Justice I. Daniel Stewart said the death sentence should be vacated because of Levine's inadequate mitigation workup and closing argument.
"It is simply not sufficient that the attorney knew about some of (Taylor's) childhood psychological problems, his learning disorder, and substance abuse in his family," Stewart said.
And the justice described the closing argument as "more a self-justification of defense counsel than a plea that the jury impose a life sentence rather than death."
In the other 4-to-1 ruling, the court said that in view of all the evidence, it was "not unreasonable" for the jury to find Brown guilty of killing Lael Brown, no relation, on Nov. 7, 1993.
Debra Brown said she found her ailing, 75-year-old former employer dead in his bed when she brought a pot of soup to his home. However, investigators later turned up evidence that she had stolen money from the victim by forging checks.
Brown cooperated with investigators and voluntarily consented to a polygraph test, which she passed. However, the trial court refused to allow the results of the test to be admitted as evidence.
She appealed her conviction, arguing the test results should have been admitted, that the prosecutor made inappropriate remarks during closing arguments, and that there was insufficient evidence to convict her.
Writing for the majority, Justice Leonard Russon said the lower court had not abused its discretion in refusing to admit the polygraph results.
"Our past cases make clear that at present time, the admission of polygraph evidence is not appropriate for judicial notice," Russon wrote.
The closing-argument issue involved a prosecutor's comments to the jury regarding Brown's decision not to testify. Noting that Brown's lawyer failed to object to the comment at the trial, the Supreme Court declined to address it now.
Russon said while Brown's conviction was based on circumstantial evidence, "it was not unreasonable" for the jury to have found her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Stewart also dissented in the Brown case, though without comment.