If any reminder were needed of the volatility of the Mideast, it could be gained from looking at the events of the past few weeks in Israel and the Occupied Territories.
But the Palestinian Arabs, who are in rebellion now, pose no serious military threat to Israel. If, as the Israelis believe, a potential threat does exist to Israel's security, then it is from neighboring states and their armies — particularly those situated to the east of Israel that might under certain circumstances strike at Israel singly or in a coalition, using conventional or non-conventional weapons.
True, the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the peace process that came in the wake of the United States-led victory over Iraq greatly decreased the prospect of an all-out Israeli-Arab war: Iraq has been weakened, Jordan — the backbone of an eastern Arab front — signed a peace treaty with Israel, and Syria has joined the peace process.
Yet the Iraqi army, though badly beaten and crippled, has not been destroyed and Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein is still capable of dispatching a contingent force to join any future eastern front against Israel. Jordan, in spite of its peace treaty with Israel, might under external and internal pressures join an anti-Israeli coalition or embark on war if Israel violates its sovereignty during the execution of strikes against, say, Iraq or Syria.
Iran, following a successful test launch last February of its Shihab-3 missile (a 17-ton ballistic missile with a range estimated at about 800 miles and able to carry a 1.2-ton payload), is a potentially serious threat to Israel. As for Syria, it is perfectly capable of executing a limited invasion on the Golan Heights if frustrated over a deadlock in the peace process.
Indeed, one of the most important lessons learned by the Arabs after the October 1973 war was that the limited use of force is effective in breaking a political stalemate. It is conceivable that the United States might turn a blind eye to a limited Arab strike against a perceived intransigent Israel to induce the nation into greater flexibility in peace talks.
The probability of a large scale Arab-Israeli military engagement in the near future is low, but the Mideast is a powder keg and the ever-present conflict between Israel and Palestinians, and between Israel and the Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, might well spark an all-out clash of arms between Israel and its neighbors.
Israel does not exclude the possibility that in a future confrontation it will face a war. It is even conceivable that while one or more Arab states could operate on the ground (for example Syria, which has a common border with Israel), others (Iraq for instance, or even Iran) could launch missiles at Israel's centers of population.
The Israel Defense Force is still an effective fighting machine, blessed with motivated and capable troops, and enjoys a technological edge and the best weaponry. It is as up to the task of fighting a war as it has been throughout the past five decades, and it can repel an Arab attack and probably win a decisive victory against any of its regional adversaries, working alone or together.
But as was demonstrated during the gulf war, Israel's weakness lies in its difficulties defending against incoming missiles and the fact that its population is not distributed evenly throughout the country but rather concentrated mainly in the areas of Tel Aviv and Haifa.
This makes Israel particularly vulnerable to missile attacks. Israel, although having the strongest air force in the Mideast, cannot rely on its air power to eliminate the launchers of missiles. For even the American-led coalition in the Persian Gulf War, which had mastery of the sky and an air power significantly larger than that of Israel, could not halt the launching of Scud missiles from Iraq against Israel. Some 40 missiles landed on Israel's territory during that war.
Acknowledging its weakness in dealing with incoming missiles, the IDF works hard to overcome this problem by extending the span and power of its long-range capabilities and training forces in the waging of operations to destroy fixed and mobile missile launchers. At the same time, Israel is attempting to acquire an effective capability for interception and the destroying of incoming missiles in the event of failure to destroy them while still on their launchers.
In preparing itself for future war against neighboring armies and tackling the problem of ballistic missiles, Israel relies heavily on the United States. Israel has asked Washington for an $800 million addition to next year's $1.98 billion in military aid. The additional funds are intended to compensate the IDF for its withdrawal from southern Lebanon last May; perhaps, more important, to afford further developments in anti-ballistic missile defenses to face the threat of the Iranian Shihab-3 missile, which was clearly designed as a delivery system for weapons of mass destruction; or even to intercept and shoot down the primitive Iraqi Scuds.
But in the post-Cold War era, with Israel becoming less of a strategic asset for the United States, Israel's best option should be to reduce the probability of war by trying to reach settlements with its Arab neighbors and the Palestinians. This would not only enable Israel to live more peacefully in the region, but also help to isolate rejectionist Arab regimes and enable the United States to deal more effectively with the dangers posed to Israel.
Ahron Bregman is a contributor to the London Daily Telegraph, author of "Israel's Wars 1947-1993" and co-author (with Jihan El-Tahri) of "The Fifty Years' War: Israel and the Arabs."