Capitol Hill is already grumbling about Secretary of State Colin L. Powell's proposal to modernize the sanctions against Iraq. Powell's critics gripe that his proposal to scale back restrictions on civilian economic activity amounts to a "weakening" of the sanctions.
But far from slackening the pressure on Saddam Hussein, Powell's strategy offers the best prospects for keeping the Iraqi leader in check.
Accusations that proposals to scale back sanctions on civilian goods amount to appeasing Hussein do not stand up to scrutiny. It is true that past efforts to revise Iraqi sanctions were undertaken to entice Baghdad into complying with U.N. demands. U.N. Resolution 1284, passed in December 1999, made some sanctions relief contingent on Iraqi cooperation with weapons inspectors, rather than complete disarmament.
In contrast to these past tinkerings, the rationale for the changes being proposed now is entirely different.
A new, leaner sanctions regime is justified by the need for dramatic steps to stem the erosion of sanctions and to revive international support for the measures most essential to containing Hussein. Maintaining U.N. control of the revenue from all legal Iraqi oil sales is crucial. So is upholding sanctions on military and dual-use items that the regime could use to build weapons of mass destruction.
In comparison, many other restrictions are dispensable. If shedding them eases pressure to lift the sanctions completely, Powell should shed them with glee. It would be a small price to pay for maintaining global support for the few sanctions that really count.
Saddam stands to gain nothing from a narrower sanctions regime. Saddam would continue to be deprived of financial resources from Iraqi oil sales and would be further frustrated in his efforts to import military items and technology.
Moreover, a revised sanctions package would hurt the Iraqi regime in several other ways. For one thing, it would curtail the oil smuggling that is swelling Saddam's coffers by more than $2 million a day.
Although the recently opened Syrian pipeline is the greatest single challenge to U.N. efforts to control all Iraqi oil revenue, smuggling over land and through the gulf waters also needs to be curbed. In return for stricter border monitoring, the Powell plan offers regional governments both relief from domestic pressures to lift the sanctions on humanitarian grounds and the prospect of greater legal trade in civilian goods with Iraq.
These incentives help explain the positive reception of Powell's proposals in the region and Syrian President Bashar Assad's willingness to consider bringing Syria's pipeline sales under U.N. auspices.
A modified sanctions approach would also rob Saddam of the moral high ground that he has wrongfully gained. The world has remained largely unimpressed by U.S. declarations — true as they are — that Saddam is responsible for the suffering of Iraqis. Ending his ability to use the misery of his own people to manipulate international opinion requires improving the plight of average Iraqis.
The choice before the United States is not between a "tough" sanctions regime and the plan Powell has proposed. Not only is the secretary's plan the tough option, but the only alternative to it is to have no sanctions at all.
Meghan O'Sullivan is a fellow at the Brookings Institution.