On June 5, 1947, U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall called for America to aid Europe in rebuilding after the devastation of World War II. The aid package would ultimately come to be known as the Marshall Plan.
In the aftermath of World War II, the various economies of Europe had been smashed. What factories and infrastructure that hadn’t been destroyed by bombs or massive land battles were still geared toward war production, and not easily redirected toward civilian manufacture. Additionally, shortages persisted throughout Europe. (In England, rationing wouldn't completely end until 1954 — nine years after the end of World War II.) The Germans themselves, once feared enemies and now a defeated, dispirited people living in an occupied nation, marched carrying signs that read, “Wir wollen kohle! Wir wollen brot!” (“We want coal! We want bread!”).
In his book, “The Hawk and the Dove: Paul Nitze, George Kennan, and the History of the Cold War,” historian Nicholas Thompson wrote: “A hungry continent began descending into famine. In the British zone of Germany, average daily caloric consumption dropped from an already dangerously low 1,500 in 1946 to 1,050 in the early days of 1947. Reports of cannibalism started coming in to aid agencies. 'We are threatened,' said the French minister of national economy, 'with total economic and financial collapse.’ ”
While the Soviet Union had occupied most of Eastern Europe, where it began the process of installing communist regimes, Greece and Turkey both fell under the political sphere of the Western Allies. By 1946-47, however, both nations faced indigenous communist revolutionary forces that many believed would topple the legitimate governments of those nations. Britain, desperate to protect Greece and Turkey from falling to communism, had no money or resources left with which to help them. World War II had sapped the last vestiges of wealth from the British empire, leaving it almost as economically devastated by the war as Germany.
In contrast to Europe, the United States was riding a wave of prosperity and plenty. The difficult days of the Great Depression were long over, and World War II, for all its horrors, had stimulated the American economy. Perhaps as much as half of the world's trade centered around the United States. The majority of Americans were employed and reaping the benefits of an unparallelled American economic boom.
Thompson wrote: “The United States suddenly had several choices to make. First and most urgently, must it bail out the two Aegean nations? A high level group including (diplomat George) Kennan met at the State Department the night that the news came of Britain's withdrawal of support. The planners quickly decided to send arms and aid. That move likely saved Greece from the insurgents.”
The March 1947 decision to send aid to Greece and Turkey was soon called the Truman doctrine, after President Harry Truman. It quickly became obvious to most State Department planners that as long as Europe's economic problems persisted, more and more nations were likely to have their own communist insurgencies. Political and economic instability are the manna of radical political parties. After all, had not Germany embraced Nazism under similar circumstances only 14 years earlier?
For the next few weeks, top American diplomats and State Department officials worked to create a policy of direct American economic aid to Europe. Though the policy was drafted by Kennan and others, the man who guided the processes and ultimately recommended it to Truman was Secretary of State Marshall. America's top diplomat had just a few years before been chief of staff of the United States Army, and had been instrumental in orchestrating the defeat of the Axis powers. Though only a “desk general,” many considered (and still do) Marshall to be the architect of American victory in World War II. Of Marshall, Truman famously said simply, “He won the war.”
After a May 28 meeting of Marshall and his planners, the secretary of state notified Harvard that he would accept an honorary degree that had been offered, and that he would like to say a few words at the ceremony on June 5. Marshall highlighted the global stakes and explained the necessity of American action:
“The truth of the matter is that Europe's requirements for the next three or four years of foreign food and other essential products — principally from America — are so much greater than her present ability to pay that she must have substantial additional help or face economic, social, and political deterioration of a very grave character. … Aside from the demoralizing effect on the world at large and the possibilities of disturbances arising as a result of the desperation of the people concerned, the consequences to the economy of the United States should be apparent to all. It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist.”
In his book, “George F. Kennan: An American Life,” historian John Lewis Gaddis wrote: “The secretary of state's address, unspectacularly delivered on June 5, 1947, left its audience unaware that they had heard something historic: like Lincoln's at Gettysburg, it got polite but not enthusiastic applause.”
Despite the audience's reserved reception of the speech, its content ultimately proved unmistakable. The United States would not allow communism to build upon a foundation of European poverty and hunger. Just as America had helped to liberate Europe from the Nazi jackboot, so too would it now use its manifold resources to help the great nations of the old world stand upon their own feet once again.
The following year, the United States formally launched the European Recovery Program, or as Truman insisted upon calling it, the Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan called for $13 billion in aid to various European countries — 90 percent in grants, 10 percent in low-interest loans. There were conditions attached to the money, however. Participating nations were required to open their financial books to the U.S., American-led economic planning committees were established for each participating nation to ensure that the money was used in the most effective manner possible. And finally, participating nations were required to spend two-thirds of the money in the United States, effectively injecting the American private sector with roughly $9 billion.
The plan was open to nearly all European nations, with Spain (a fascist state with Nazi sympathies) being the largest notable exception. Britain, France, West Germany and Italy were the largest participants, though French leaders were unhappy with the conditions placed upon the plan. The Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc nations were also invited to participate, and showed signs early on of taking advantage of the plan. Moscow ultimately vetoed the idea of its new satellites taking part, however, as the conditions were viewed as a capitalist plot to undermine communism, which, in fact, they were.
The Marshall Plan helped to stabilize the economies of Western Europe and ensured that the impending mass starvation was averted. More than that, the American decision to aid Europe was a declaration that the United States would not sit idly by as the Soviet Union plotted to take advantage of human misery, poverty and famine in an attempt to spread its totalitarian system of slavery.
Cody K. Carlson holds a master's degree in history from the University of Utah and currently teaches at SLCC. He has also appeared on many local stages, including Hale Center Theater and Off Broadway Theater. Email: ckcarlson76@gmail.com.