On Jan. 22-23, 1879, roughly 150 English soldiers held their position against nearly 4,000 Zulu warriors at the Battle of Rorke's Drift. The battle illustrated the superiority of Western discipline and training on the battlefield, even in the face of an enemy's vast numerical superiority.
The British and other Europeans had been colonizing South Africa since the early 19th century, and increasingly they came up against the hostile forces of native armies. The largest and most powerful native kingdom was the Zulu. After a series of clashes between the Zulu army and British civilians, the British government sent an ultimatum to the Zulu King Cetchwayo in Decemeber 1878. Among the points the British demanded was that the Zulu army be disbanded, heavy fines for various offenses against the British, and greater rights and protection for British missionaries.
Cetchwayo did not respond to the ultimatum by the Dec. 31 deadline, and the British took this as justification for their move against him. Acting without orders, Lt. Gen. Barn Chelmsford took an army of just under 2,000 British troops into Zululand. Overconfident in his weapons and men, Chelmsford divided his forces, not unlike George Armstrong Custer had only 2½ years earlier on the other side of the planet. He met the Zulus on Jan. 22, 1879.
Concentrating their forces, 20,000 Zulu warriors soon infiltrated the British positions at Isandlwana, amazing the British with their ability to move quickly and silently, appearing in the midst of the British lines. Such stealth and surprising maneuver led to a massacre. More than 1,300 British soldiers were killed, many of them mutilated before death. The Zulus lost only 1,000 men in the engagement.
Emboldened with their victory at Isandlwana, the 4,000 Zulus who had acted as a reserve force struck out at Chelmsford's supply line. Under the command of Prince Zabulamanzi, brother to the king, the Zulus crossed the Buffalo River and targeted the trading post and mission of Rorke's Drift. This was in violation of Cetchwayo's orders. Zabulamanzi had been told not to invade the British colony and, under no circumstances, was he to engage entrenched British troops.
Before Chelmsford's force had engaged the Zulu, Maj. Henry Spaulding had been ordered to turn the post into a supply dump and hospital. When Spaulding rode out for reinforcements the same morning that the British force met its fate at Isandlwana, Lt. John Chard of the Royal Engineers was left in command. Riding toward the ford near the post, Chard and another officer, Lt. Gonville Bromhead, encountered survivors of the massacre. Chard, Bromhead and other officers then debated their course of action. Should they run or stand their ground. Fearing that the Zulu could easily destroy them while on the move, the decision was made to fortify Rorke's Drift and fight.
Defending the trading post would not be easy. The two farmhouses, converted to a storage building and a hospital, both boasted thatch roofs, which could easily be burned. High ground sat around the house that could not be defended. Thirty-five soldiers sat sick in the hospital and must be mobilized to take part in the defense. A wall, trees and other obstructions ensured that the defenders would not have a clear field of fire. Neither Chard nor Bromhead had much in the way of battlefield experience.
The first order of business for the British was to create a perimeter that encompassed both buildings, as the post had no perimeter wall. A parapet was constructed between the buildings, and wagons were brought in close to offer additional protection. Part of a stone Kraal (corral), abutted the perimeter and worked into the defense. Importantly, stocked in the storehouse sat two hundred pounds of mealie bags which were used to construct the remainder of the perimeter.
In the book, “Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles and the Rise of Western Power,” historian Victor Davis Hanson wrote: “The bags were a godsend, since their weight and density meant that bullets could not penetrate the British wall, while it was almost impossible to knock the heavy sacks over. Holes were gouged in the hospital's outside wall to allow the patients to shoot at the (warriors) approaching from the south. In a stunning feat of improvised labor, officers, native soldiers, the sick and British enlisted men in little more than an hour constructed a barricade of some 400 yards — all under the threat of imminent annihilation.”
The battle began around 4:20 p.m., with the Zulus encircling the post and making several piecemeal attacks. Soon after the firing started, some of the men abandoned the post and ran. Chard believed that the length of the perimeter could not be held, and he ordered his men to construct a new perimeter wall out of biscuit boxes, perhaps as a last redoubt. In some areas along the perimeter the Zulus had succeeded in breaking through and deadly hand to hand fighting ensued, though the British enjoyed successes in beating them back along the line.
By 7 p.m. the sky was darkening and the Zulus had succeeded in setting fire to the hospital's thatch roof. Chard ordered the sick out of the hospital and to fall back to the biscuit box line. Of the 35 ill soldiers, only eight perished in the escape. About the same time, Spaulding approached with reinforcements but, seeing the burning hospital fire of his distant command, believed the battle over and retreated.
The Zulu attacks intensified. Rather than rush the perimeter from all sides simultaneously, the warriors sought to probe the defenses, searching for a weak avenue of attack that could be exploited. It was an unnecessarily costly maneuver that allowed the British, boasting interior lines, to shift forces from one threatened sector to another.
In the early hours of the 23rd, the attacks appeared to taper off. The officers ordered that breeches in the perimeter be repaired while cautious scouting parties advanced beyond the defenses to gather Zulu spears and intelligence. Critically, Chard ordered that the men remain at their posts along the perimeter, lest the Zulus attempt another attack. At 7 a.m. the British spied a new Zulu force on the hills and prepared for another assault. The Zulus, however, soon disappeared.
Surveying the area, the British located 351 dead Zulus, and later accounts suggested as many as 800 warriors had perished in the battle or later from their wounds. Hanson wrote, “The British lost just 15 dead and 12 wounded. … The British counted more than 20,000 cartridges expended, a phenomenal number for a mere hundred or so soldiers who were doing the actual firing. … For every redcoat killed, more than 30 Zulus fell.”
The British newspaper The Daily Mail recently reprinted a letter from Assistant Commissary Officer (ACO) Walter Dunne, describing the battle less than a day after its events:
“About 1000 of the (Zulus) came in here and attacked us. … We had got about 2 hours notice and fortified the place with trap of grain biscuit boxes. … They came on most determinedly on all sides. They drove our fellows out of the Hospital, killed the patients and burned the place.
“They made several attempts to storm us but the soldiers (B Co of 24th under Bromhead) kept up such a steady killing fire that they were driven back each time. We had only 80 men, the contingent having bolted before a shot was fired. The fight was kept up all night & in the morning the (Zulus) retreated leaving 351 dead bodies.”
The Battle of Rorke's Drift illustrated the importance of discipline in battle. By holding the line and refusing to yield the perimeter wall to the Zulus, the post's defenders were not only able to keep the Zulu warriors out, but they were able to inflict massive casualties to an army that could not likewise punish them. The victory had less to do with military technology than with British training, respect for command and the ability to improvise.
Like the Spartan 300 at Thermopylae or the Frankish army at Tours, disciplined infantry had successfully proven its worth.
Cody K. Carlson holds a master's in history from the University of Utah and teaches at Salt Lake Community College. An avid player of board games, he blogs at thediscriminatinggamer.com. Email: ckcarlson76@gmail.com