On June 24, 1812, Napoleon Bonaparte made perhaps his greatest blunder by invading Russia. Though he recognized the dangers of invading such a huge country, political factors demanded that he move against Russia or risk losing French domination of Europe.
Following a series of defeats in Eastern Europe at the hands of Napoleon, what the French emperor called “The First Polish War,” Russian Czar Alexander I was forced to sign a humiliating peace treaty with France in July 1807. The Treaty of Tilsit was signed by the two emperors on a small boat on the Nieman River, the new border between the Russian empire and the newly French-dominated Duchy of Warsaw.
The treaty called for Russia to ally itself with France, its former enemy, and declare war upon England. Additionally, Napoleon meddled with Russia's borders. One of the most important aspects of the treaty, however, was Napoleon's insistence that Russia join the Continental System.
After the 1805 Battle of Trafalgar, in which a combined French-Spanish fleet was beaten by the British, Napoleon's hopes for an invasion of southern England were dashed. Napoleon's 200,000-man Army of England — a French force set to invade England — had sat in ports along the English Channel for years, waiting to be transported across the sea. Napoleon knew that the British army in southern England would be no match for his land forces, but the Royal Navy could easily block any invasion flotilla. After Trafalgar, the French emperor looked to different methods to subdue the British.
The Continental System was put in place in May 1806. Essentially, it was a boycott of all British goods throughout French-dominated Europe. Napoleon had famously called Britain “a nation of shop keepers,” and now he intended to defeat Britain through depriving it of markets and driving its economy into the ground. The Continental System never worked as intended, however. Markets in the Americas and elsewhere picked up the slack for Britain and, ironically, demand for British goods went through the roof in Europe, causing prices of smuggled contraband to skyrocket.
The following years saw Napoleon invade Spain and Portugal, a disastrous campaign that forced him to commit more and more resources to the region while gaining little in return. The great French army found itself bogged down fighting Iberian guerrillas and, eventually, the British army. The Prussians had joined the French sphere at the same time as Russia in 1807, and Austria had been subdued and forced to ally itself with France in 1809.
Though Alexander initially had hopes that the Continental System would bring about a general peace in Europe, it quickly became apparent that Britain wasn't about to back down. Meanwhile, Russia, with its immense territories filled with raw materials and farmland but little manufacturing capability, was suffering heavily from its lack of trade with Britain. In the book, “Russia Against Napoleon: The True Story of the Campaigns of War and Peace,” historian Dominic Lieven wrote:
“The Continental System was beginning to cause Russia major difficulties. Alexander recognized always that Russian adherence to Napoleon's economic blockade of Britain was 'the basis of our alliance' with France. To restore relations with Britain would be to breach the core of the Treaty of Tilsit and make war with Napoleon inevitable. … By 1810, however, it was clear that something had to be done to reduce the damage being caused to Russia by the Continental System.”
Lieven noted that the Russian rubble was collapsing, and the only way to pay for Russia's massive military force was simply to print more money without regard to real value. Additionally, business interests fell off as investors lost confidence in Russia's economic viability. Exports were down, as was customs revenue. At the same time, France used the blockade to bolster its own exports and justify its plunder of Europe. In short, the weapon Napoleon wielded to defeat his enemy England was slowly strangling his ally Russia.
In late 1810, Alexander announced that Russia would impose higher import rates on goods arriving over land, a clear shot at the French. Also, the wording of the decree allowed for some wiggle room when it came to trading with England, though Russia still formally upheld the blockade. The decree put Napoleon on notice that his attempts at total economic domination of Europe ended at the Russian border.
In the book “Napoleon's Wars: An International History,” historian Charles Esdaile quoted Gen. Armand de Caulaincourt's meeting with Napoleon after the Russian announcement:
“His majesty received me coldly, and at once began heatedly to enumerate his … grievances against the Tsar Alexander. … He spoke of the (decree) prohibiting foreign imports, and of the admission of neutral … ships into Russian ports, which, he said, was an infringement of the Continental System. He went on to say that the tsar was treacherous, that he was arming to make war on France ….”
From that point forward, Napoleon considered war with Russia a real possibility and, as time went by, an increasing probability. After all, if a nation openly defied Paris, others might follow and that could easily bring about the end of French domination in Europe. He did not relish the idea of another war with Russia. The Russian army, while backward in many ways, was immense and not easily dismissed. It boasted competent generals, who had shown a talent for improvisation in the past. The real fear for Napoleon of course, was the immense territory of Russia itself. How could one subdue a nation so massive?
Napoleon's hope, therefore, was that he wouldn't need to. It was possible that a massive French army on Russia's border might compel Alexander to back down. A campaign in Russia, too, would not necessarily have to march all the way to Moscow. A decisive victory or two near the border would probably be enough to force Alexander back to the negotiating table, where he could once again be put in his place.
Additionally, another brief war with Russia, another “Polish War,” could cement France's hold over Eastern Europe. Perhaps the conflict could be used to expand the Duchy of Warsaw into a greater Polish state allied to France — a counterweight to Russia in the east.
Esdaile offered his own explanation for Napoleon's decision to invade Russia: “Frustrated by the long war in Spain and Portugal, and the failure of Continental Blockade to bring the British to heel, Napoleon was simply bent on flexing his military muscle and winning fresh glory.”
Perhaps Napoleon believed that a military victory in Russia would force a political decision elsewhere — perhaps in Spain, perhaps with England.
Napoleon's mind was set, and by late spring 1812 an enormous military force began assembling in the Duchy of Warsaw. The emperor planned the organization of the invasion force in Dresden until May, when he began to ride throughout Prussia to inspect the forces moving eastward. In addition to French troops, Prussians, Poles, Westphalians and others began to assemble just west of the Nieman. Indeed, fully half of Napoleon's 500,000-man army was made up of non-French troops.
On the evening of June 23, the French and allied troops began to prepare for the crossing. Boats were prepared to ferry the light troops across the river and companies of engineers readied their equipment to build military bridges. Many officers studied Voltaire's account of Swedish King Charles XII's 1709 invasion of Russia.
In the book, “The Reign of Napoleon Bonaparte,” historian Robert Asprey quotes Napoleon's proclamation to the troops:
“Soldiers! The second war of Poland begins … let us therefore march to the front, let us cross the Niemen, let us carry the war to the enemy's land. The second war of Poland will be as glorious for French arms and as the first. But the peace that we shall make will be final, and will end the deadly influence that Russia has exercised for fifty years on European affairs.”
The next day, Napoleon's massive military force crossed the Nieman River into the Russian empire. Later that day, news of the invasion reached Zakrent, where the czar was attending a ball. Alexander and his generals put their long-prepared plan into motion to retreat and leave nothing behind for the advancing French. Far from giving in to Napoleon's intimidation, the Russians retreated and harassed Napoleon all summer long.
After the Battle of Borodino in September, French forces captured Moscow, believing that the campaign had been won and that Alexander would now surrender. The Russians, however, did not surrender. After fires engulfed the Russian capital, Napoleon was forced to retreat. As an early winter set in and Russian harassment increased, Napoleon's army began to dissolve. Far from strengthening his position, the invasion of Russia exposed French vulnerabilities and the limits of Napoleon's military leadership.
Napoleon's tragic mistake was summed up over a century later by British Field Marshal Sir Bernard Law Montgomery: “The first rule of warfare is not to march on Moscow.”
Cody K. Carlson holds a master's in history from the University of Utah and teaches at Salt Lake Community College. An avid player of board games, he blogs at thediscriminatinggamer.com. Email: ckcarlson76@gmail.com