Julius Caesar won a major triumph over the forces of Pompey the Great at Pharsalus, in 48 B.C. on what historians calculate is about Aug. 9. The battle broke the back of republican opposition to Caesar and opened the way for his dictatorship of Rome.
Several years before, in 59 B.C., Caesar joined Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus (Pompey the Great), and Marcus Licinius Crassus to form an informal political leadership of Rome, referred to by historians as the First Triumvirate. Each brought something to the table. Pompey's reputation as a military commander and all its glory added prestige to the alliance, and Crassus' great wealth funded their program.
Unlike Pompey and Crassus, who belonged to the optimates faction, which represented the Patricians, or nobility, and best families of Rome, Caesar belonged to the populares, the common people's faction. Caesar's connection to the people of Rome made him a valuable asset.
Though the Roman senator and orator Cicero was invited to join this alliance, he feared it would turn Rome into a narrow oligarchy and declined. To shore up the political alliance, Pompey married Caesar's daughter, Julia, though she was 30 years his junior.
After his consulship, Caesar took up duties as the governor of Gaul, where he won considerable wealth and military glory. Typically, governorships lasted for five years, but with the help of his political allies, Caesar was able to convince those in the Senate to extend his position past its initial expiration date. Many Romans thought this was improper and decidedly un-Roman.
The political alliance soon began to break down, however. Julia died in childbirth in 54 B.C., severing the family tie between Caesar and Pompey. The next year, Crassus, jealous of Caesar and Pompey's reputation for military glory, launched an invasion of Parthia, Rome's neighbor the east. The war proved a disaster for Rome, and Crassus was killed during a parley.
Pompey, too, soon grew jealous of Caesar's exploits in Gaul, and with the collusion of the Senate, ordered him back to Rome in 50 B.C. Soon, Caesar and Pompey both called the other traitors to the republic, and Caesar crossed the Rubicon river, which served as Italy's northern border, with a legion. The civil war had begun.
Unable to raise an army in time to defend Rome, Pompey and several senators, including Cicero, Cato the Younger and Marcus Brutus, fled across the Adriatic Sea to Greece. From there, they hoped to secure a power base, raise revenue and prepare an army to meet Caesar.
Unopposed, Caesar entered Rome. In contrast to the dictator Sulla, who decades before set about mercilessly killing his political enemies by means of a proscription list, Caesar offered amnesty to those who had opposed him in exchange for their future allegiance. Caesar set out for Spain to take on pro-Pompey forces. Crushing them quickly, he soon turned about and headed for Greece.
When Caesar landed his forces in Greece in the summer of 48 B.C., he found himself in the weaker position. Pompey's forces boasted perhaps 50,000 men, both Romans and Greek allies, while Caesar's stood at around 30,000. Not only was there a numerical disparity, but logistical concerns haunted Caesar's army as well. Most residents of the area supported Pompey and the senators. Food and supplies were hard to come by, and he was a long way from his power base in Rome.
After Caesar's army was nearly wiped out by Pompey at the Battle of Dyrrachium in early July, his position became even more tenuous. His desire to bring about a decisive battle with Pompey on his terms only grew, though his adversary had other plans.
Pompey delighted in the situation. His intention was not to battle Caesar again, if he could help it. Instead, he merely had to wait Caesar out. Sooner or later, his forces would dwindle from sheer attrition and shortages. Caesar attempted several times to bring Pompey to battle, but the old general refused. Sitting tight was in Pompey's interest. The senators who had accompanied him, however, viewed Pompey's inaction with disdain.
In the book “Rubicon: The Last Years of the Roman Republic,” historian Tom Holland wrote: “But in his council of war tempers were fraying. The senators in Pompey's train, impatient for action, wanted Caesar and his army wiped out. What was wrong with their generalissimo? Why would he not fight? The answer was all too readily at hand, bred of decades of suspicion and resentment: 'They complained that Pompey was addicted to command, and took pleasure in treating former consuls and praetors as though they were slaves.'”
Against his better judgment, Pompey finally accepted Caesar's offer of battle on Aug. 9. Pompey decided to use his cavalry to break through on Caesar's right flank, though Caesar was prepared for this tactic. Concealing troops behind his center, Caesar ordered his left flank to retreat in an orderly fashion, inviting Pompey's cavalry further toward his lines. Then, once the cavalry finally engaged with Caesar's pulled-back infantry, he let loose his hidden troops, which unexpectedly attacked the cavalry's right flank.
Holland wrote: “Caesar... had formulated the perfect tactic. Pompey's cavalry turned and fled. Next, his loosely armed slingers and archers were cut down. Domitius, leading the left wing, was killed as his legions buckled. Caesar's men, outflanking Pompey's line of battle, then attacked from the rear. By mid-day the battle was over. That evening it was Caesar who sat down in Pompey's tent and ate the victory meal prepared by Pompey's chef, off Pompey's silver plate.”
Caesar's forces lost just 200 men. Approximately 15,000 of Pompey's men were killed and more than 20,000 taken prisoner. The battle decisively ended the civil war, and also ended Pompey and the senators' cause. Despite his numerical inferiority and logistical problems, Caesar had emerged triumphant.
Pompey, who had sought to merely wear Caesar down by attrition, fell into the trap of letting military novices dictate his strategy, and it had disastrous consequences. It was not the first or the last time that a sound military strategy of sitting still was ignored. The Athenians had abandoned Pericles' strategy of sitting tight behind Athens' walls during the Peloponnesian War 400 years earlier. Gen. Robert E. Lee rushed to attack the Union Army at Gettysburg 1,900 years later.
In the book, “Cicero: The Life and Times of Rome's Greatest Politician,” biographer Anthony Everitt noted Pompey's reaction to the defeat: “When Pompey saw how the battle was going, he withdrew to his camp where he sat speechless and stunned. Nothing in his long, cloudless career had prepared him for such a disaster. He changed out of his uniform and made his escape on horseback.”
Indeed, Pompey the Great, the hero of battle after battle in Rome's many wars, fled across the Mediterranean Sea to Egypt, hoping to connect with allies there and perhaps restart his efforts to battle Caesar. It was not to be. The young King Ptolemy XIII's advisers worried that taking Pompey's side in the Roman conflict would give Caesar the excuse he needed to end Egyptian autonomy. With that in mind, Pompey was assassinated while wading ashore near Alexandria.
Cicero, Brutus and most of the senators surrendered themselves to Caesar, swore allegiance to him and returned to Rome. Cato the Younger, however, eventually committed suicide rather than live under Caesar's dictatorship. Soon after Pompey's death, Caesar did indeed go to Egypt and place limits on the kingdom's sovereignty.
The Battle of Pharsalus proved a turning point in Roman history as Caesar's triumph allowed him to further subvert the republic and become Rome's king in all but name. After his assassination in 44 B.C., the stage was set for his adopted son Octavian to complete the process of turning Rome into a military dictatorship.
It is doubtful, however, that a successful Pompey could have ultimately saved the republic in the long run. When all of Rome's myriad political and economic problems, endemic corruption, and rigid class interests are taken into consideration, it is difficult to see Caesar as the cause of the fall of the republic, but rather its greatest symptom.
Cody K. Carlson holds a master's in history from the University of Utah and teaches at Salt Lake Community College. An avid player of board games, he blogs at thediscriminatinggamer.com. Email: ckcarlson76@gmail.com