The first phase of President Donald Trump’s proposed ceasefire has provided welcome relief for Israelis and Palestinians affected by wartime violence the past two years. In addition to the release of 20 remaining Israeli hostages in concert with the release of approximately 1,700 Palestinian detainees, flows of humanitarian aid are entering Gaza at unprecedented rates, including from the southern Rafah crossing at the Egyptian border.
In the interim, Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty has announced the formation of a 15-member panel who will work in concert with Trump’s proposed “Board of Peace” to oversee postwar governance in Gaza. Despite a pause in general violence, however, hundreds of thousands of Gaza residents remain in desperate need of basic nutrition, medical care, short-term housing, as well as a return to jobs and school.
I have followed the conflict long enough to avoid predictions about the future trajectory of peace between Israel and Palestine. Instead, the past week reminds me of how public opinion — especially polling, media sentiment, voting and public protests — so often shapes the formation and durability of peace settlements.
For the Trump administration, Israel’s airstrike on Qatar last month provided enough blowback for the president to pressure Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to accept a deal that has been on the table for many months. Photos of the prime minister on the phone with the Qatari Emir during a meeting with Trump in the West Wing earlier this month provide a case in point.
Prior to Bibi’s visit to Washington, increasing numbers of Trump’s core supporters were growing skeptical of U.S. support for Israel, especially the unconditional provision of arms and ammunition to the war effort.
While about half of the Republican base still thinks the U.S. is providing the right amount of military aid to Israel, over one third of likely voters under 30 think this amount is too much. Even a 55/45 split within the GOP on U.S. support for Israel could have significant consequences in the 2026 midterms, especially in the House.
Within Israel, public opinion about the war, as well as the prospect of a looming election, shape how Netanyahu navigates the next stage of the ceasefire process. On the one hand, the departure of far-right coalition members — especially Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich — could collapse the government and trigger an early election (parliamentary elections are already scheduled for October 2026).
And given the right flank’s leverage within the current coalition, it wouldn’t be surprising to see Netanyahu drag his feet on the IDF withdrawal from within the Strip (currently at the “Yellow Line,” then eventually to the security buffer and corridor and ultimately to the perimeter of Gaza). He may also be slow to install the Palestinian elites chosen to serve on Gaza’s transitional council.
Far more concerning, however, is the lack of domestic political constraints on Netanyahu’s decision to resume the war — either on justified or false pretenses. More significantly, absent pressure from Trump, it is unlikely Bibi will make the costly sacrifices necessary for a more sustainable peace, especially as it relates to core issues such as West Bank settlement expansion and settler-initiated terrorism.
There’s also a remaining outside risk that President Trump simply gets bored with the peace process and moves on to other foreign policy crises.
The most important elements of Palestinian public opinion relate to how local residents will view the legitimacy of the political, economic and security institutions in charge of postwar Gaza. With Hamas barred from postwar governance and record low support for Palestinian Authority elites in Ramallah (60% of Palestinians see the Palestinian Authority as a burden), it remains to be seen which Palestinian representatives can garner enough public support to make difficult political decisions.
Worse yet, as the IDF withdraws to the “Yellow Line” — and international peacekeepers have yet to arrive — it remains unclear which security forces will be able to suppress violent clashes between Hamas militants and rival, clan-based militias. Like other asymmetric conflicts, external peacekeepers will only be effective at providing security if they can credibly win the “hearts and minds” of the local population.
More hopefully, while we have good reasons to think that most Palestinians will support Qatar’s lead on reconstruction within the Gaza Strip, we still lack reliable data on how the average Palestinian views other components of the Trump proposal.
Finally, domestic politics within regional states will affect the nature and durability of the peace process, especially for the security and economic initiatives which require multilateral coordination.
- To Israel’s north, it remains to be seen whether Lebanon’s central government has the ability and resolve to further weaken and isolate Hezbollah, let alone pursue diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv.
- In neighboring Syria, there remains an outside chance President Ahmed al-Sharaa decides to sue for peace with Israel, even if Damascus ultimately decides against formally joining the Abraham Accords.
- To the south, Egypt remains a critical partner in not only providing border security but also allowing aid to flow across the Rafah crossing. While President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi currently has a firm grip on repressing domestic dissent, domestic unrest at home could undermine Sisi’s foreign policy abroad.
Ultimately, the transition from ceasefire to peace settlement will depend less on international summits or foreign aid packages than on the gradual rebuilding of public trust — especially between citizens and their leaders.
