Utah’s loss to BYU on Saturday didn’t come down to just fourth-down decisions.
The Utes lost the turnover battle 2-0, and the muffed punt near the end of the second quarter was especially costly in terms of momentum.
Then was the 14-0 stretch in the fourth quarter where the Cougars easily marched down the field, picking apart Utah’s defense to take a 24-14 lead.
The Utes didn’t do themselves any favors, either, committing 12 penalties for 77 yards, and Lander Barton’s second-half targeting penalty loomed large as Utah was without one of its best defensive players in the fourth quarter.
All of those factors were huge in the Utes’ loss, but none have been criticized more in the 48 hours following Utah’s third straight rivalry defeat than coach Kyle Whittingham’s decision to go for it on fourth down three times.
Postgame, Whittingham emphasized the role of analytics in making those fourth-down decisions, and in Monday morning’s press conference, elaborated more on that process.
Like pretty much every Power Four school in the nation, Utah utilizes analytics during games to help make decisions in key moments, including whether to kick a field goal or go for it.
Utah subscribes to an analytics company every year, and those analytics are tailored and customized, factoring in Utah’s team strengths, the opponent they are playing, how the Utes have done in similar situations so far and Utah’s field-goal kicking percentage, among a lot of other things.
The analytics software will recommend a decision on fourth down.
“I mean every week it’s customized. It’s not just an arbitrary, here’s your plan for the year. And so that’s why it makes so much sense,” Whittingham said.
Whittingham has leaned heavily into analytics in the past few years.
In prior years, he was known to be more conservative on decisions like going for it on fourth down, but in those years, Utah usually had a rock-solid field goal kicker. In the past few years, however, Whittingham has been more aggressive on fourth downs, mirroring a trend in college football and pro football as more and more coaches adopt analytics.
“First of all, if you think you’re smarter than analytics, you’re not. Anybody out there, if you think you got better grasp of the game and strategy than the analytics do, you don’t,” Whittingham said.
He noted that unforeseen circumstances like having a couple offensive linemen injured or trying to kick a 50-yard into “50 mile an hour wind” would change the decision.
“I mean there’s things that do arise and so we pay close attention to analytics but not exclusive attention,” Whittingham said.
Did Whittingham’s reliance on analytics cost Utah a rivalry win in a game decided by six points? It’s not as simple as adding nine or six points to the final score, he says.
For example, BYU went for it themselves on fourth-and-5 from the Ute 23-yard line with 2:50 left in the game up 24-14. Cougars coach Kalani Sitake likely doesn’t do that if it’s a one-possession game at that point.
“People that say, well, if you’d have kicked a field goal, add three points to the score, this is what it would’ve been. No, that’s entirely false. As the score changes, people’s tactics change and the play calling changes based on the situation. So you can’t just say at the end of the game, well if he’d done this and this, this would’ve been the score because that’s ludicrous to think that way,” Whittingham said.
Let’s take a look at each of the three fourth-down decisions in Saturday’s game (Utah was 1 for 5 on fourth downs total, but those last two decisions were out of desperation down 10 with three minutes left.)
Fourth-and-1 from BYU 12-yard line, 7:31 1Q, Utah 0, BYU 0
This was easily the most defensible fourth-down decision by Whittingham.
Utah entered the game as one of the best teams on fourth down, converting 80% of their attempts.
(Utah ranks about middle of the pack nationally in fourth-down attempts with 15, but that’s also due to having one of the best third-down conversion rates in the nation and not having to make fourth-down decisions often this season. Even after Saturday’s 5 of 12 third-down performance, Utah still ranks No. 1 nationally in third-down conversion percentage, 57.6%,)
A 29-yard run by Daniel Bray on a jet sweep got the Utes to the edge of the red zone. Dampier scrambled on first down after not seeing any open receivers, then kept the ball on second and third downs on designed runs.
That set up fourth-and-1 from the Cougar 12-yard line, and with the success on fourth downs entering the game and the Utes’ offensive line, it was a reasonable decision to go for it and try and cap off the first drive for the offense with a touchdown.
“The analytics in that particular situation you were talking about, it was a full on go all the way up to fourth-and-5 or less. And so at fourth-and-1, it’s a no-brainer,” Whittingham said.
“I mean I don’t know anyone in the country that subscribes to analytics — and I would say 90% at least of Power Four teams do, maybe a hundred percent — (that) would not have gone forward in that situation. And so that was an easy call, one of the easiest calls of the game, fourth-down wise.”
The analytics clearly favored going for it in that situation, and the call to go for it from Whittingham was not a bad one in that stage of the game, with the Utes needing just one yard to gain.
“... Touchdowns are so much more valuable than field goals,” Whittingham said.
“That’s why analytics is so heavily in favor of fourth-down conversions in the red zone, because of that. A field goal is actually a loss in the red zone. I mean, that means you’ve moved the ball and you’ve got within striking distance, but you bogged down. And so we try to do everything we can to score touchdowns as does everyone in the country. And that was the reason for that is the analytics and my own personal opinion were aligned.”
The play call could have been better, though that’s easy to say in hindsight. The jet sweep to Bray worked a few plays earlier, and offensive coordinator Jason Beck had just faked the jet sweep on the third-down play before Dampier kept it, so there had to be some thought in BYU’s heads that the jet sweep on fourth down could be a fake.
On fourth down, however, the Cougars were all over Bray on the jet sweep, and Mory Bamba made a great tackle on Bray to get the stop for BYU.
A better block by receiver Larry Simmons on Bamba could have resulted in a Utah first down.
“We didn’t block it exactly, that particular play, exactly correct. And I don’t want to get into who was incorrect or any of the specifics, but we didn’t execute it very well,” Whittingham said.
Fourth-and-7 from BYU 28-yard line, 9:14 2Q, BYU 7, Utah 0
The Cougars had just struck first on the previous drive, scoring a touchdown to take a 7-0 lead.
Utah got down to the BYU 31-yard line easily enough, but things went south, starting with a Dampier pass while being pressured to 317-pound Semi Taulanga, who caught it for a loss of seven.
Dampier scrambled for 10 yards on third-and-17 to to get Utah back into field-goal range, and the Utes brought freshman kicker Dillon Curtis on to attempt a 46-yard field goal.
Utah’s analytics were “on the cusp” of going for it or kicking the field goal, but Whittingham chose to kick.
That looked to be the correct decision — just get points and respond after the Cougar touchdown — but that calculus was changed when Curtis missed his practice field goal after BYU called a timeout.
The kick was nowhere close, veering far off to the right.
That caused Whittingham to change his mind.
“When we saw the kick go fairly significantly wide right, we said, you know what? Let’s just go for it,” Whittingham said.
Curtis is just one-for-four this season from 40-49 yards. Do you give your kicker a second chance after he missed that badly, and is 25% from that distance on the season, or do you change your mind and go for it?
Whittingham went for it, but Dampier couldn’t connect with Tobias Merriweather on a sideline throw and the Utes came away scoreless again.
Fourth-and-3 from BYU 8-yard line, 8:52 3Q, BYU 10, Utah 7
Utah had a chance to tie up the game in the middle of the third quarter, but yet again Whittingham elected to go for touchdown.
Dampier connected with Dallen Bentley for six yards on third-and-9, making it fourth-and-3 from the eight-yard line.
Again, the analytics said to go for it, but kicking a chip-shot field goal would have tied the game in the third quarter. This was the most head-scratching decision to go for it all night.
Dampier rushed it this time, but was stopped short of the line to gain. If Dampier followed a blocker on the outside, he might have moved the chains.
“We were coming off a very good game on fourth down against Arizona State. We put the ball in our best players’ hands, Devon Dampier and just didn’t work out that particular time. But like I said, after the game, bad result doesn’t necessarily mean it was a bad decision going into it,” Whittingham said.