The blow-up between Presidents Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Donald Trump, along with Vice President JD Vance, creates even more questions about the viability of both a Ukrainian-Russian peace deal, and the more specific mineral deal Zelenskyy and Trump had anticipated announcing Friday.
Many questions remain in this fast moving atmosphere. We spoke with academic peacemaking expert Anna O. Pechenkina for more context. Hailing from Ukraine herself, Pechinkina is an associate professor of political science at Utah State University, whose research focused on how peace emerges out of war and why it succeeds or fails.
Deseret News: What are your initial thoughts after witnessing this angry exchange between Ukranian and U.S. leaders today?
Anna Pechenkina: First of all, there exists a fundamental disagreement between the U.S.’ and Ukraine’s positions. The Trump administration continues to advocate for the immediate ceasefire regardless of details. By contrast, Ukraine’s position is that no ceasefire can be signed without security guarantees for Ukraine. Zelenskyy unsuccessfully attempted to explain during this meeting that Putin cannot be trusted because he broke multiple prior agreements. It appears that Trump is motivated in portraying himself as a peacemaker without considering how to make such a ceasefire last.
The meeting devolved into an unnecessarily rude exchange. Vance escalated this meeting by falsely claiming that Zelenskyy was ungrateful and was negotiating in front of American media. It appears that Vance’s animosity towards Zelenskyy is profound and personal, just like his scolding of the EU leaders was during the Munich security conference two weeks ago.
I think it was a mistake for Zelenskyy to participate in this meeting without synchronous translation. Even leaders who understand English well enough (e.g., Putin) request synchronous translation to have a few extra moments to prepare a response and avoid emotional reactions. For instance, Zelenskyy tried to communicate that “one day (the U.S.) will feel (the consequences of Putin’s aggression if he invades Poland).” This escalated the meeting further, because Trump looked offended and snapped “Don’t tell us how we’ll feel.” Given Trump’s temperament, it would be wise to use synchronous translation in the future.
As a final point, the minerals deal could be one way to make the hypothetical ceasefire more stable: If the U.S. has substantial material interest in establishing and securing large-scale mining operations in Eastern Ukraine, then its private companies would stand to lose income if Ukraine is reinvaded by Russia in the future.
DN: At this point, are you optimistic about the prospects of this U.S.-mediated peace arrangement? Based on the current realities on the ground and diplomatic discussions, what do you think is most likely to happen in the months and years ahead?
AP: Sadly, no. We need to distinguish two types of peace here. Although the Trump administration may achieve a ceasefire soon, Ukraine’s main concern lies in preventing another Russian invasion in the medium-term future.
Before the sides start discussing substantive issues of international defense agreements or domestic policies, they will need to agree on two things, most basically: where the line of separation lies and who enforces it.
First, the short-term issue that might prevent the sides from reaching a ceasefire is the line of separation. In June 2024, Putin demanded that Ukraine cede the northern parts of the Kherson, Zaporizhzhya, Donetsk and Luhansk provinces that are currently not under Russia’s occupation but which are claimed in Russia’s constitution since September 2022 as Russian land (while Crimea was annexed and claimed in the Russian constitution in 2014). It is difficult to imagine any leader of Ukraine ceding additional territory that is currently under Ukraine’s control.
Will Putin change his tune and readily accept the line of separation based on the current frontline map? Autocrats have a wide range of options in manipulating public opinion, so he might, but at what price? Ukraine holds a small area of Russian territory in the Kursk oblast — symbolically a large bargaining chip for Ukraine. It would be utterly heartbreaking for Ukraine, if the Trump administration would try to force Ukraine to cede that Kursk territory in exchange for Russia agreeing to the current line of separation as opposed to ceding some of the occupied territory back to Ukraine.
Second, another issue that might prevent the ceasefire and/or undermine peace stability in the medium term is peacekeepers. Data reveal that peacekeepers’ mandate is key to peace stability. This is especially true when peacekeeping personnel have a mandate to use military force to keep settlements. In that case, peacekeeping troops are associated with lowering combat deaths. By contrast, peacekeeping observers (personnel without a mandate to use arms) are not associated with a reduction in violence.
Given these findings and Ukraine’s fear of Russia reinvading in a few years after having re-armed, any peacekeepers placed along the line of separation will need to be armed and will need to have a mandate to use force. So far, the European countries have agreed to provide 30,000 troops stationed away from the frontlines in military bases near major Eastern Ukrainian cities. It is telling that European states wish to avoid placing their peacekeepers along the line of separation. But what’s also important, Russia is strongly opposed to European military bases inside Ukraine.
DN: Even though the optics of Ukraine left out of the initial negotiation were awkward, some have wondered whether this might strategically be a good way to get Russia to agree to something (versus having both combatants at the table). Your thoughts?
AP: Right now, the Trump administration has signaled willingness to pressure Ukraine to concede on major issues, such as: ceding occupied territories to Russia, no membership in NATO and no U.S. troops as peacekeepers along the ceasefire line. It is a strange move to open negotiations by making these major concessions to Russia. To be clear, I believe these concessions would likely be made during negotiations under a hypothetical Harris administration, as well. The frontline map largely has not changed since December 2022, which means that many Ukrainians are exhausted by war and would be willing to support a painful compromise. I am questioning, however, the rationale for giving away these issues without having secured anything in return.
Furthermore, in the past week, both the U.S. president and his Ukraine envoy have echoed Russian propaganda’s talking points — about Zelenskyy being an illegitimate leader or his low public support — which are false. These statements do not appear to be negotiating tactics and should make us all concerned about what information sources the current administration is using to make its decisions.
DN: Would you anticipate a peace deal will include the release of captive Ukrainian and Russian soldiers? Will it include the return of Ukrainian children?
AP: Definitely. Throughout the war, there were multiple POW exchanges (the most recent ones in December 2024 and in January 2025). I expect any ceasefire to be accompanied by additional exchanges of POWs.
The issue of Ukrainian children is more complicated, but slow progress is being made on that issue, as well. While it is possible to imagine an exchange of “all for all” when it comes to captive soldiers, it is difficult to imagine that Russia would return all Ukrainian children taken into Russia, as many of them have been placed with adoptive or foster families there.
