Editor’s note: President Trump announced Saturday that a truce had been reached between India and Pakistan, according to several major media outlets.
For decades now, it’s been assumed in the field of security studies that the first nuclear exchange in a conflict would take place on the Indian subcontinent, between India and Pakistan. There have been incidents in the past that have come close, such as when nuclear bombs were loaded onto aircraft by these countries in 1999, but the crisis was averted by the efforts of then-President Bill Clinton. The most recent flare-up when nuclear sabers were rattled by India and Pakistan was in 2019, and again U.S. intervention was pivotal in achieving de-escalation.
Terrorist activity has often precipitated these escalatory spirals, and that has been the catalyst yet again. On April 22, terrorists machine-gunned more than two dozen people in Indian-controlled Kashmir, a territory claimed by both nations. India retaliated by shelling what it said were terrorist camps across the “line of control” between Pakistani-controlled Kashmir and Indian-controlled Kashmir.
Pakistan is now retaliating, with shells dropping on several towns and cities in Indian-controlled Kashmir. The defense minister of Pakistan is reported as saying, “There is a very vivid and clear possibility that this confrontation will expand.”
That would be truly unfortunate. The impetus for the use of nuclear weapons lies in the fact that Indian military forces dwarf those of Pakistan. In addition, India’s military budget is nine times that of Pakistan. If push came to shove, Pakistan would get shoved. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by Pakistan was meant to deter such a foreseeable outcome, and that has arguably been the case to date. Even so, the continuing hostility of the two countries, mixed in with terrorist attacks by militant groups, shakes Indo-Pakistani deterrence to the core every few years, and the world can only wonder how sturdy that nuclear deterrence is in reality.
A nuclear war between the two countries has been war-gamed over and over by military planners, so we have a good idea of what the price would be if deterrence failed. Both countries have approximately 170 warheads, typically of 50-100 kiloton yield. India has a full nuclear triad — land, sea and air — with Pakistan missing one leg: the sea component. Both countries have missiles that can reach any part of its foe’s territory. Because of its military advantage, India has adopted a “No First Use” doctrine, meaning it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons in a conflict, for it is Pakistan that is likely to need first-strike capability.
If an all-out nuclear exchange were to occur between India and Pakistan, it is estimated that up to 125 million would die after escalation from tactical nukes to airbursts to ground bursts. But those would only be the first casualties, as the two countries would likely then be plunged into prolonged scarcity and famine, the death toll from which might even outstrip that from the detonations themselves. Furthermore, smoke and dust from the nuclear explosions would also probably affect global weather patterns, decreasing both temperature and sunlight, also jeopardizing agriculture in lands far from the Indian subcontinent. Effects would be felt for up to a decade.
No wonder many nations of the world, such as the U.S., the United Kingdom, China, Iran and the United Arab Emirates have called on the two countries to step back from the brink of nuclear escalation. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has spoken with officials in both countries, urging them to de-escalate immediately. But already the conflict is having longer-term repercussions. The day after the April 22 terrorist attacks, India suspended its water-sharing agreement with Pakistan, which is devastating for Pakistani agriculture, and India has also lobbied the International Monetary Fund to deny new loans for Pakistan.
There are also larger geopolitical considerations at play. The biggest arms seller to Pakistan is China, a clear example of “my enemy’s enemy is my friend.” There have been recent clashes between Chinese and Indian soldiers over disputed territory, and Pakistan might look to China to offer a form of extended nuclear deterrence.
How easily nations forget what was learned in the early years of the Cold War: a nuclear war produces no winners, only losers. The only thing nuclear weapons are good for is, ironically, preventing their own use through deterrence: the “balance of terror,” as it was known then. But as yields have decreased and the terror they are capable of instilling has decreased with them, nations have once again begun to speak of nukes as usable weapons. We have certainly seen that in the Russia-Ukraine war, where Russia has been rattling its nuclear saber at the U.S. and Europe for the past three years.
At some point, I fear this slipshod thinking will result in nuclear use, which will harm every person on the planet in one way or another. During the Cold War, there were many attempts to help understand what that would entail; one of the most successful efforts was the 1984 BBC docudrama, “Threads.” The screenplay was written by professional writers working with scientists who were able to describe exactly what biological, social and environmental effects that survivors of a nuclear exchange in Sheffield, England would likely experience, out to 15 years post-detonation. The effect on that generation was sobering in the extreme, helping to catalyze the nuclear freeze movement, and, arguably, the INF Treaty later on. If you have never seen “Threads,” it is well worth viewing even now.
As a sign of the times, the BBC has just announced it is making a new series — a reboot of “Threads.” How apropos, especially since European nations are busy dusting off their plans for survival after nuclear attack. However, given what we know now, the new series should not be set in Sheffield, as it was in 1984. Rather, it should be set in Islamabad. That is the wake-up call the world needs now, in 2025.