Judging from the news accounts following the hostage crisis at Alta View Hospital, most observers would conclude that the police operation was a success.
The police safely rescued eight people and apprehended Richard Worthington, who had held the hostages for about 18 hours.But not everything went as smoothly as initial police reports would indicate. For example:
- Just as the negotiations reached the critical stage, the phones went dead. - The command post - that group of officers responsible for the outcome of the siege - could not communicate with all the negotiators and tactical units throughout the ordeal.
- Shortly after police had reached an agreement with the gunman, the Salt Lake SWAT team, which up to that point had been the main tactical unit, pulled out of the women's center without warning. And SWAT teams ordered to replace them did not know the plan.
- Officers at the command post issued orders without conferring with negotiators, causing SWAT teams to think the gunman was ready for them to enter his territory when, in fact, he was not.
A dozen interviews with officers from each jurisdiction involved illustrate that the last 30 minutes of the crisis were plagued with problems that could have been disastrous.
A month after the ordeal, Salt Lake County Sheriff Aaron Kennard says he still puzzles over which "successes" can be attributed to good police work and which should be attributed to plain luck.
Sandy command labeled the operation a success, but officers from other agencies, while pleased with the outcome, are eager to discuss the problems and analyze what should have been done differently.
The Utah Tactical Officers Association, comprising all the valley SWAT teams, will meet early next month to discuss the crisis.
With the help of SWAT team leaders,members and negotiators, the following illustrates what happened during the last minutes of the siege.
The primary negotiator, Salt Lake Police Sgt. Don Bell, was speaking with hostage Marge Wyler on the telephone. Wyler, an Alta View nurse, said Worthington was making some demands and she was getting ready to list them when the phone went dead.
An officer who was stationed in the "incident command center," or command post, said the command post's "advisory board" ordered workers to try to fix their phones so they could not only monitor Bell's conversation but also be able to talk with the hostages themselves. In the attempt to connect command center phones to the women's center, all the phone lines were severed.
When Bell realized he could not re-establish contact with Wyler from where he was working, he ran with his bull horn to the women's center's second floor.
Just when he thought he was not going to be able to make any headway, he spotted a SWAT sergeant with a cellular phone.
"I grabbed the phone and dialed a number I knew about but hadn't used," Bell said. It worked - Wyler answered the line. Bell kept the phone and ran toward the command post. He had no way of communicating with officers in charge except in person - even before the lines went down.
As Bell ran to the command post, Wyler relayed demands from Worthington - the first demands from the gunman that police could even consider.
Bell told command post officials there was a breakthrough and listed Worthington's demands. But the officials refused them.
By then, Bell still didn't have a working phone in his area, but there was one phone sitting on a car near the command post that connected with the building. He grabbed the phone and continued to pound out an acceptable surrender with Wyler.
He was also relaying information about the plan to Salt Lake SWAT through an officer assigned to stay at his side throughout the ordeal.
Believing Salt Lake SWAT was getting into position and that they understood the plan, Bell told Wyler that Worthington's bishop would enter the third floor first. Worthington agreed to hand the gun to hostage Adam Cisnero at that time - Wyler would say to Bell, still on the phone, that the gun was out of Worthington's hands.
Meanwhile, SWAT was supposed to remain out of sight in the stairwell.
Bell would then tell SWAT they were now "dealing with an unarmed suspect," which would be their signal to move in.
As Bell continued finalizing details with Wyler and an erratic Worthington, the SWAT officer assigned to him said that Salt Lake SWAT was no longer in the building - three other teams had replaced them and Bell had no way of contacting the new teams.
The new SWAT teams didn't know the plan and the command post had not informed the negotiator of the change.
When questioned a few days after the incident, Salt Lake Police Lt. Larry Stott said his team had been in the building since 8 a.m. and should have been relieved two hours earlier. They were too tired to carry through with the command to usher Worthington's bishop and wife to the third floor.
But one of the Salt Lake SWAT members said his leaders felt the command post was "betting the farm" by taking civilians into the building. It was too risky to involve Worthington's bishop and wife in such a volatile situation.
"They were right," said an officer from one of the other SWAT units, speaking on condition of anonymity. "But hostage negotiating is not an exact science. If Karen Worthington's voice could calm the gunman and save eight lives, the rest of us were willing to take the risk."
West Valley, West Jordan and the Utah Department of Corrections SWAT teams took over for Salt Lake on the second floor.
Their orders from the command post, not Bell, were to enter the third floor where Worthington was "waiting for them" and clear the way for Worthington's wife and bishop to enter, said West Valley Police Lt. Blane Palmer.
The officers in the command post did not confer with Bell before issuing the orders, which differed from the agreement reached with Worthington through Wyler.
By the time the command post realized it had issued altered instructions, the SWAT teams were separated from any radios the command post could use to stop them.
Eight SWAT officers entered with 9mm assault rifles and were staring at Worthington before they realized he was surprised - and upset.
"I've never been so scared in my life," one officer said. "Dynamite is always a lose-lose proposition."
Bell said he was still on the phone with Wyler when she told him SWAT officers were already there.
Bell told Wyler what to do to calm the gunman, and SWAT officers also spoke directly to the gunman in an effort to restore order.
The SWAT officers still stood in the hall when the initial panic was over, not knowing what the instructions from Bell were, Palmer said.
Wyler went into the room where the hostages and bomb had been housed for 18 hours. She embraced Worthington and told him she cared about what happened to him, Bell said.
Cisnero came out of the room first and Wyler followed, holding one of the babies. Worthington handed her the gun and then allowed the other hostages to exit. Bell was no longer in contact with anyone in the building.
According to Palmer, Worthington began yelling something like "This isn't the way it was supposed to be." He started running away from SWAT officers, who had to force their way through the hostages to wrestle Worthington to the ground, fearing he was heading for the dynamite. Palmer said that at the last moment, Worthington did not surrender.
Palmer promised Worthington earlier that if he was arrested, officers would allow him to talk to his wife, which he did before officers led him away.
The seige, which started after nurse Karla Roth was killed and the hostages were herded at gunpoint onto the third floor of the center, had come to a successful conclusion.
"I hope we come out of this with everyone who was there critiquing it," Bell said. "Let's figure out all the things we did wrong, everything, and then let's analyze them so they don't happen again."