When Sandy Police Capt. Bob Wright arrived at Alta View Hospital about 1:30 a.m. Sept. 21, he knew there was a man holed up in the Women's Center who, tactically speaking, held most of the cards.
One woman was dead, there were hostages, and the man had weapons and explosives in a building full of people.Wright said he had a wish list when he arrived. He wanted:
- Everyone in the hospital out safely.
- No loss of life among officers.
- The building left standing.
Wright's wishes eventually were granted but not before poor communication and interdepartmental squabblings seriously threatened the operation.
As police began arriving at the hospital, Wright immediately declared himself "incident commander" and began sketching an organizational chart similar to that on any boardroom wall. He filled the positions with people from several police jurisdictions.
"Incident command allows the commander to draw as needed from all resources," Wright explained. "Jurisdictional lines disappear in an incident the magnitude of the Alta View ordeal."
He made his assignments and held off all comers - including the Salt Lake County sheriff, the head of Utah Department of Public Safety, the head of Utah Department of Corrections, a very independent Salt Lake City SWAT team, and several other leaders from the 14 law enforcement agencies who gathered to look over his shoulder. He remained in command until Sandy Police Chief Gary Leonard arrived 12 hours later.
One month after the successful rescue of five adults and three newborn infants, officers finally talked about the experience, agreeing almost without exception that Sandy appropriately took command of the situation.
However, most police officers say they didn't really know who was in charge throughout the ordeal and were confused by the number of people issuing orders from the command post.
SWAT team leaders said they could not get a decision out of the command post because the center couldn't communicate on all radio frequencies, and it took too long to get a consensus from the high-powered group gathered around Wright.
Rumors of conflict between Sandy incident command and Salt Lake SWAT were fueled by the abrupt withdrawal of the SWAT team, which was supposed to escort the gunman's wife and her bishop to the floor where the gunman was confined.
However, Salt Lake SWAT Lt. Larry Stott denied any problems, saying his officers had been in the building since 8 a.m. and were tired.
The afternoon negotiator, Salt Lake Police Sgt. Don Bell, said it was difficult for him and the Salt Lake SWAT team to operate under their "invited guests" status.
Bell said he was interrupted often while conversing with hostages. One time, someone from the command center asked Bell how many schools he had attended. An irritated Bell answered, "Not enough."
A lack of trust for him as well as inexperience on the commanders' side also frustrated Bell. For example, he worked hours to get Worthington to agree to allow police to deliver formula and diapers for the babies. When he advised the command post that Worthington had finally agreed, the command post insisted that in exchange for the goods, Worthington must release some of the hostages. Bell said he used too much precious time explaining to the command post that it was he - not Worthington - making the request.
Bungled communication from incident command, according to some SWAT officers, caused West Valley SWAT to confront Worthington before he was ready. They say Worthington still could have detonated the bomb.
Speaking on condition of anonymity, one officer in the command post said he felt Salt Lake County Sheriff Aaron Kennard arrived in the early afternoon specifically to take over the command post.
But Kennard said he had no intention of relieving Sandy of command, although he did have that option as the county's chief law enforcement officer.
The sheriff said he received two calls before he arrived at the scene reporting conflict among some of the police agencies.
"The police chiefs and I are still meeting and still analyzing the Alta View crisis," Kennard said. "It's important we resolve some of the problems we experienced with incident command."
There were critical errors made, Kennard said, but if he had it to do over again, he would still leave Sandy police in charge.
"I was hoping my presence added to their authority," he said.
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How it all came together
Incident commander: As the ranking officer from the jurisdiction in which the incident took place, Sandy Police Capt. Bob Wright took charge. He remained in charge until Sandy Police Chief Gary Leonard arrived.
Incident team: These people, regardless of what jurisdiction employs them, answered to Wright. They included specialists in the following areas: perimeter and evacuation, SWAT and tactical efforts, fire and medical, explosives, hostage negotiating, criminal investigation, and hospital maintenance.
Advisory groups: Three other groups were organized for support and advice.
- Police chiefs and other law enforcement directors had direct access to Wright.
- Those with firsthand knowledge of the incident, including two of the officers who originally responded to the call and probably witnessed the shooting death of nurse Karla Roth, remained nearby.
- A staging and property management command post, which coordinated manpower, equipment, food and other needs, was set up at the Sandy Police Station.
Agencies involved: Sandy Police, Sandy Fire, West Valley Police, West Jordan Police, Salt Lake City Police, Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office, Salt Lake County Fire, Salt Lake County Attorney's Office, Utah Department of Corrections, Granite Security Police, Salt Lake County Emergency Services, FBI, Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and the U.S. Army.