The latest agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, signed by Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Chairman Yasser Arafat, was only the latest in a series of agreements between Israel and the Palestinians that breaks no new ground but intends to clarify previous pacts. Given this record, one might have expected the accord signed at Sharm el Sheik, in the presence of President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, King Abdullah of Jordan and U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, to have been greeted with a wide yawn. It was not, and rightly so, because a major new element is now present that was not present before. That element is Israel's new prime minister, Ehud Barak.
Put differently, the reason for optimism over this accord, despite our sad experience with three previous agreements, none of which was implemented, is that a factor present in the past, which was largely responsible for their non-implementation, was not present this time: Benjamin Netanyahu, the former prime minister.Nevertheless, questions remain. Whether implementation of the Sharm el Sheik accord will lead to successful final-status talks will depend on the answers to these questions.
Barak's unexpected insistence on certain changes in the Wye agreement led to a crisis in the resumption of the peace process. Specifically, Barak insisted that the third withdrawal called for by the Wye agreement be delayed and, more significantly, be "folded" into the final-status talks. While the timing issue could have been worked out -- in fact it was, and there is now agreement that it will begin in January -- it was clear Palestinians could not agree to a linkage of the final withdrawal to agreement on final-status issues. Such linkage could have delayed the implementation of the third redeployment for years. It is not clear from information made available to date whether Barak has finally agreed to a complete severing of that third withdrawal from agreement on final-status issues.
At Sharm el Sheik, Israel seems to have agreed for the first time that no further Israeli settlements will be established. There was such an agreement at Wye River, but it was compromised by the subsequent insistence by Netanyahu and his associate, Ariel Sharon, that they remain free to engage in unlimited expansion of existing settlements. It is not clear whether unlimited expansion of existing settlements, in the past a pretext for the establishment of new settlements, is precluded in the Sharm el Sheik agreement.
Finally, a major source of potential conflict in the past was the Palestinian insistence that they have a right to unilaterally declare Palestinian statehood, should no agreement be reached by the specified end-date of the Oslo Accord, a position strongly contested by Israel. Statements made by spokesmen for both sides following the Sharm el Sheik meeting indicate the parties are still not fully in accord on this crucial point.
Nevertheless, there is reason to hope that the restoration of renewed trust between Israel and the Palestinians created by the Sharm el Sheik agreement will enable the parties to negotiate differences over these and other points.
To be sure, the possibilities for renewed deadlock are strewn like land mines over the political landscape. These political land mines can be diffused, but only if each of the parties develops the ability to place itself in its adversary's shoes -- something that is essential if they are ever to reach a final accord.
Henry Siegman is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.